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Recent Decisions
jurisdictional problem (Murphy dealt with a question of interjurisdic-
tional immunity while Kastigar dealt with immunity in an intrajuris-
dictional situation).36 In resolving the immunity question in favor of
use and derivative use immunity, the Court expressed the belief that
the transactional immunity Statutes in effect for the past seventy years
were wastefully broad.
The Court did not expressly overrule the holding of Counselman
that the immunity granted must be coextensive with the scope of the
fifth amendment privilege, but, on the contrary, expressly affirmed that
principle. Because of Kastigar, the Counselman case itself, along with
the other transactional statutory and case law, has been trimmed to the
more essential use and derivative use immunity of Kastigar. The prob-
lem that is seen in the Court's limiting of the Counselman decision
rather than expressly overruling that decision is that although the
decision in Kastigar is "consistent with the conceptual basis of Counsel-
man,"3 7 the immunity adopted in Kastigar is the type of immunity that
the Counselman case specifically found insufficient to replace the fifth
amendment's privilege.
Howard B. Zavodnick
TORTS-RIGHTS OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE TO SUE EACH OTHER
FOR NEGLIGENCE OF THE OTHER-DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMU-
NITY-The Indiana Supreme Court has held that the common law doc-
trine of interspousal immunity in tort actions is abrogated.
Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 1972).
Plaintiff sued to recover damages for injuries sustained by her on Janu-
ary 6, 1964, while riding as passenger in an automobile driven by the
defendant. The complaint was filed on July 28, 1964. While the action
was still pending plaintiff and defendant were married on June 8, 1969.1
36. 378 U.S. at 79. The Murphy Court granted the petitioner only use and derivative
use immunity but this was in a situation where the state witness was compelled to give
testimony which might be incriminating under federal law. Since Murphy, there is now
use and derivative use immunity with respect to the federal government. The witness is
left in substantially the same position as if he had claimed the privilege while this permits
the state to secure the needed information.
37. 406 U.S. at 453.
1. Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 1972).
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The Indiana Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision sustain-
ing the defendant's motion for summary judgment and entering a
judgment for the defendant based upon the doctrine of interspousal
tort immunity.2 The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court and held that the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity
in a tort action is abrogated based upon a finding that the reasons ad-
vanced for the promulgation of the doctrine were no longer sound. 3
It is argued by the proponents of the doctrine that to allow suits be-
tween the husband and wife would only tend to disrupt the tranquility
of the home.4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is often quoted for
expressing such a fear: 5
The flames which litigation would kindle on the domestic hearth
would consume in an instant the conjugal bond, and bring a new
era indeed-an era of universal discord, of unchastity, of bastardy,
of dissolute, of violence, cruelty, and murders.
Such an argument was considered unpersuasive by the court in Brooks,
especially in light of the numerous decisions allowing the wife to bring
actions against her husband in areas other than in tort.6 The court relied
on Prosser 7 to answer the question as to how a cause of action in torts
can cause a disruption of domestic tranquility while a cause of action in
contracts cannot.
The second argument advanced by the proponents of the doctrine
claim that to allow such suits would only tend to promote fraud, collu-
sion, and trivial litigation, especially when insurance is involved."
"Remove from the defendant the risk of loss and substitute the covert
hope of profit and a situation arises that should give us pause."9 The
2. Brooks v. Robinson, 270 N.E.2d 338 (Ind. App. 1971).
3. Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ind. 1972).
4. See Comment, Interspousal Immunity-a policy oriented approach, 21 RUTGERS L.
REv. 491, 493 (1967).
5. Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396, 398 (1858).
6. See Carter v. Carter, 118 Ind. 521, 21 N.E. 290 (1889) (wife permitted to bring action
of ejectment against her husband); Pavy v. Pavy, 121 Ind. App. 194, 98 N.E.2d 224 (1951)
(spouse permitted to maintain an action in partition against the other spouse); Hinton v.
Dragoo, 77 Ind. App. 563, 134 N.E. 212 (1922) (either spouse permitted to enforce an
agreement to repay monies).
7. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971). In referring to those jurisdictions
that deny the wife the right to sue husband in tort on the basis that it would cause a
disruption of domestic tranquility but yet allow her to sue in contract or bring criminal
prosecutions, Prosser commented: "If this reasoning appeals to the reader let him by all
means adopt it." Id. at 863.
8. See Comment, Interspousal Immunity--a policy oriented approach, 21 RUTGERs L.
REV. 491, 493 (1967).
9. Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 295, 282 P.2d 572, 578 (1955).
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court in Brooks felt to summarily deny relief to all litigants in these
cases was contrary to the spirit of our legal system. 10 The court, there-
fore, adopted the same philosophy that the Supreme Court of California
adopted in Klien v. Klien" when it balanced the interest of every citi-
zen's right to have a judicial forum for the redress of injuries against
the possibility of fraudulent claims.' 2 In addition, the possibility of
fraud is substantially reduced since the testimony of both the husband
and wife are subject to impeachment under the normal evidentiary
procedure.'3
A third argument advanced by many of the proponents of the doc-
trine involves the concept that the abolition of the doctrine should
come from the legislature rather than from the judiciary.14 The court
responded in Brooks by stating that since this doctrine was judicially
created in Henneger v. Lomas' 5 it can and should be judicially abol-
ished: "The strength and genius of the common law lies in its ability
to adapt to the changing needs of the society it governs."' 6 The court,
however, in judicially abolishing the common law doctrine of inter-
spousal tort immunity, did so in light of a state statute specifically
recognizing the doctrine.17 Such a statute, the court felt, was nothing
more than legislative awareness of a judicially created doctrine, and,
in light of the letter and spirit of the Indiana Constitution,, the court
felt the doctrine was now unsound and should be abolished. 19
The doctrine of interspousal tort immunity has its origin in the com-
mon law concept of unity of the husband and wife.20 The concept of
10. Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. 1972).
11. See 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962).
It would be a sad commentary on the law if we were to admit that the judicial pro-
cesses are so ineffective that we must deny relief to a person otherwise entitled simply
because in some future case a litigant may be guilty of fraud or collusion.
Id. at 696, 376 P.2d at 73, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
12. Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. 1972).
13. Id; see J. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EvIDENCE 66-108 (2d ed. 1972).
14. See Comment, Interspousal Immunity-California Follows the Trend, 36 S. CAL. L.
REV. 456, 467 (1963).
15. 145 Ind. 287, 44 N.E. 462 (1896).
16. Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E. 794, 797 (Ind. 1972).
17. IND. R. TPAL P., RULE T.R. 17(d) (Supp. 1970) (emphasis added):
Sex, marital, and parental status. For the purpose of being sued there shall be no dis-
tinction between men and women because of marital or parental status; provided how-
ever that this subsection (d) shall not apply to action in tort.
18. All courts shall be open; and every man, for injury done to him in his person,
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.
IND. CONs-r. art. 1, § 12.
19. Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ind. 1972).
20. See Comment, Interspousal Immunity-California Follows the Trend, 36 S. CAL. L.
REV. 456, 459 (1963).
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unity between the spouses is said to have its origin in Genesis. 21 This
concept of unity, as developed by the scriptures, was adopted by the
common law courts.22 The Indiana Supreme Court in Dodge v. King'
specifically considered this unity concept and found it to be the common
law doctrine of the Indiana jurisdiction. The wife during the common
law period was said to have lost the capacity to contract. 24 If any prop-
erty was conveyed to the husband and wife they held the land by en-
tireties and were unable to dispose of any part of the land without the
assent of the other.2 5 Any contracts made between the husband and
wife, without the intervention of a trustee, were void, although they
were sometimes upheld in courts of equity.2 6 As a result of marriage
all the wife's choses in action, rights, and personal property vested in
the husband.27 The husband was liable for all actions brought against
the wife, committed during or before coverture. 28 The wife could bring
no action for redress of her injuries whether the injury occurred before
or after the marriage unless the husband was joined as a party to the
suit.29 Such common law principles were based on the idea that the
husband and wife were one and not on the theory that the wife was
under a legal disability.80
As a result of the wide acceptance of the concept of unity between
husband and wife, the doctrine of interspousal immunity, in a tort
action, developed throughout the United States.3 ' The Supreme Court
of the United States in Thompson v. Thompson32 accepted the doc-
trine of interspousal tort immunity as the common law rule for the
District of Columbia. The Supreme Court of. Indiana first recognized
the doctrine, in the tort area, by way of dictum in Henneger v. Lomas.83
21. Id. at 458. "This now my bones and my flesh . Genesis 2:23. "They two (man
and woman) shall be one flesh." Ephesians 5:31.
22. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARms 422:
By marriage the husband and wife are oneperson in law; that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or is at least incor-
porated and consolidated into that of the husband.
23. 101 Ind. 102 (1881).
24. See Parks v. Barrouman, 83 Ind. 561 (1882); Godfrey v. Wilson, 70 Ind. 50 (1880).
25. See Patton v. Rankin, 68 Ind. 245 (1879); Arnold v. Arnold, 30 Ind. 302 (1868); Davis
v. Clark, 26 Ind. 424 (1866).
26. See Hileman v. Hileman, 85 Ind. 1 (1882); Resor v. Resor, 9 Ind. 347 (1857).
27. See Fleriner v. Fleriner, 29 Ind. 564 (1868).
28. See Ball v. Bennett, 21 Ind. 427 (1863).
29. See Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323 (1861).
30. See Barnett v. Harshbarger, 105 Ind. 410, 5 N.E. 718 (1886).
31. See Comment, Interspousal Immunity-California Follows the Trend, 36 S. CAL. L.
REv. 456 (1963).
32. 218 U.S. 111 (1910) (action by the wife against the husband for assault and battery).
33. 145 Ind. 287, 44 N.E. 462 (1896) (action by wife for her own seduction by the hus-
band which occurred before the marriage).
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Henneger has been continually' cited as authority for establishing the
common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity within the Indiana
jurisdiction.3 4
.But both common law concepts, husband and wife unity and inter-
spousal immunity, have been modified by statute and case law. The
passage of the Married Women's Act35 by the Indiana Legislature un-
dermined the common law unity theory of husband and wife. In fact,
some jurisdictions with similar Married Women's Acts have held that
those statutes abolished the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity.86
The doctrine of interspousal immunity, other than in tort actions, has
been equally modified by case law.3 Evenin the tort area the doctrine
has been riddled with numerous exceptions. Henneger v. Lomas,85 the
case that established the doctrine, was itself an exception. The Indiana
court in In re Estate of Pickens 9 held the doctrine inapplicable when
the action was based upon wrongful death. Similar exceptions have
been carved out where the action has been based on intentional tort,40
or when the marriage has been terminated by separation 4' or divorce.42
The Indiana Supreme Court made its heaviest criticism of the inter-
spousal tort immunity doctrine in the Pickens case, some seventy years
after it was first recognized. The Pickens court felt that the doctrine
was almost completely overruled by the Married Women's Act.43 But
despite such criticism the court in Pickens decided not to overrule the
doctrine but rather distinguished the case on its facts. 44 The Supreme
34. See Harry v. Arney, 128 Ind. App. 174, 145 N.E.2d 575 (1957); Hunter v. Livingston
125 Ind. App. 422, 123 N.E.2d 912 (1955); Blickenstaff v. Blickenstaff, 89 Ind. App. 529, 167
N.E. 146 (1929).
35. See IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 101-26 (1949). As an example of the scope of the act,
section 101 states: '.All legal disabilities of married women to make contracts are hereby
abolished."
36. See Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95, 97 (Alas. 1963) (based on a statute very similar
to the Indiana statute the Alaska court held that a wife may sue her husband during the
marriage).
37. See cases cited note 6 supra. Carter v. Carter, 118 Ind. 521, 21 N.E. 290 (1889) (wife
permitted to bring action of ejectment against her husband); Pavy v. Pavy, 121 Ind. App.
194, 98 N.E.2d 224 (1951) (spouse permitted to maintain an action in partition against other
spouse); Hinton v. Dragoo, 77 Ind. App. 563, 134 N.E. 212 (1922) (either spouse permitted
to enforce an agreement to repay monies).
38. 145 Ind. 287, 44 N.E. 462 (1898) (doctrine held not to apply since the marriage was
considered a nullity).
39. 263 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. 1970).
40. Apitz v. Dames, 205 Ore. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955) (intentional shooting of wife
resulting in her death).
41. Goode v. Martinis, 58 Wash. 229, 361 P.2d 941 (1961) (wife permitted to maintain
action while parties were legally separated).
42. Gaston v. Pittman, 413 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1969).
43. 263 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ind. 1970).
44. Id. at 156. The court distinguished the case since the action was based on the wrong-
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Court of Indiana, only nine months after the Pickens case, finally laid
to rest the common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity in
Brooks.45
The court in Brooks was not forced under the factual situation to
abolish the common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. The
court could have followed the philosophy in the Pickens case, limiting
its holding to the strict facts of the case. The court could have held that
the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity is inapplicable when both
the injury and filing of the complaint occur prior to the marriage. Such
a holding would not have conflicted with the policy reasons advanced
by the proponents of the doctrine. One could not argue that to bring
such a suit would cause a disruption in domestic tranquility. The ex-
change of vows occurred long after the complaint was filed. Nor could
it be argued that allowing such suits would encourage fraudulent
claims. They were at most mere friends at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
But the court, instead of making such a distinction, took the oppor-
tunity to totally abolish the interspousal tort immunity doctrine. It is
difficult to criticize the actual holding of the case for the policy reasons
behind the doctrine are no longer valid. But by totally abolishing the
common law doctrine the court not only overruled a long history of
case law but the court also overruled rule 17(d), the Indiana statute
which specifically recognized the doctrine of interspousal tort immu-
nity.46
Overruling the case law presents no real problem. The doctrine of
stare decisis is not a doctrine that is strictly pursued when the law is
out-moded. It is the function of the courts to keep pace with the changes
in society. The real problem with this decision is that the court ex-
pressly overruled a statute that specifically recognized the interspousal
tort immunity doctrine.47 The court in Brooks argued that the statute
ful death statute and held that the common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity
did not apply.
45. 284 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ind. 1972).
46. IND. R. TRiAL P., RULE T.R. 17(d) (Supp. 1970).
47. In overruling both the well established case law and the statutory law the question
arises as to what is the proper role and function of the state supreme court. Can the judi-
ciary adequately analyze the far reaching effects that may result from such a decision? For
contrasting philosophies on this issue see both the majority and dissenting opinions in Moli-
tor v. Kaneland Community Hosp., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) (school district tort
immunity held unjust, unsupported by any valid reasons, and without a rightful place in
modem day society). See also Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968) (any
change from contributory negligence to comparative negligence can best be handled by
the legislature).
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was nothing more than legislative awareness of a judicially created doc-
trine; that is, the legislature never intended to incorporate the judicially
created doctrine into the body of the statutory law. The Indiana Su-
preme Court is not alone in its interpretation of such a statute.48 But
there are courts that hold to the contrary when interpreting similar
statutes. 49
The question arises as to which interpretation is proper. If one begins
with the premise, as did the court in Brooks, that the doctrine itself is
unfair and the policy reasons behind the doctrine are no longer valid,
and in addition finds that the state constitution confers upon its citizens
a remedy for injuries through due course of law, one can conclude, and
rightfully so, that the statute was given a proper interpretation. Build-
ing upon such premises one can properly conclude that the Indiana
Supreme Court was acting within its bounds in overruling both its own
precedent and the Indiana statute when it abolished the doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity.
Orlando R. Sodini
48. The New Jersey Supreme Court, under its statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 2-5
(1959), which is similar to Indiana's, interpreted its statute in a manner similar to the
court in Brooks when it was confronted with an identical problem. In Long v. Landy, 35
N.J. 44, 171 A.2d 1 (1961), the court construed the statute as not freezing the common law
doctrine but held, "[wihen the policy behind the rule no longer exists the rule should
disappear." Id. at 51, 171 A.2d at 4. The New Jersey Supreme Court later in Immer v.
Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970) (wife suing husband for injuries as a result of the
negligent operation of an automobile), held that the reasons behind the tort immunity
doctrine were not present in this case. Id. at 488, 267 A.2d at 485. Since the legislature did
not intend to incorporate the common law doctrine into the statutory language but only
intended the statute to be nothing more than legislative awareness of a common law doc-
trine, the court held that the statute did not apply to claims arising out of motor vehicle
accidents. Id. at 495, 267 A.2d at 488. The Immer decision is especially interesting
since in a prior case the New Jersey Supreme Court in Kaplik v. C.P. Trucking
Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958), held that the common law doctrine of interspousal
tort immunity is now part of the statutory law. Id. at 9, 141 A.2d at 38. It should be noted
that the New Jersey Supreme Court went further than the Indiana Supreme Court in over-
ruling the legislative statute. Not only did the New Jersey Supreme Court overrule the
legislative statute that specifically recognized the common law doctrine of interspousal tort
immunity, but it also overruled the Kaplik case which specifically incorporated the com-
mon law doctrine into the statutory law.
49. The Illinois Supreme Court, under its statute, ILL. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1 (1959),
which is similar to Indiana's, in Heckendorn v. First National Bank, 19 Ill. 2d 190, 166
N.E.2d 571 (1960) (wife suing husband's estate for injuries sustained during the marriage),
held that the statute was intended to bar the present action. Id. at 195, 166 N.E.2d at 574.
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